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CHAPTER 15 
Zoning and Land Use 
RICHARD G. HUBER* 
§15.1. Racially Discriminatory Intent: Claimed Violationof14th 
Amendment and Fair Housing Act of 1968. During the 1977 Survey 
year, the Supreme Court applied its recent decision in Washington v. 
Davis1 to the area of zoning regulation. In Davis, plaintiffs challenged 
the constitutionality of police force entrance examinations, basing their 
attack on the disproportionate rate of failure among black examination 
takers. The Court held that in the absence of discriminatory intent, 
state action is not unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially 
disproportionate impact.2 The Court applied the Davis principle to zon-
ing in its decision of Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous-
ing Development Corp. 3 
Arlington Heights is a suburb located approximately 26 miles from 
Chicago. During the 1960's the town experienced rapid population 
growth. The 1970 census reported a population of approximately 64,000 
people, of whom only twenty-seven were black.• Zoning had been 
adopted by ordinance in 1959, with the vast majority of land in Arling-
ton Heights zoned for detached single-family residences. The land in 
question was a vacant fifteen acre portion of a tract of eighty acres 
owned by the Clerics of Saint Viator, a Roman Catholic drder. The 
entire eighty acres was zoned R-3 (Arlington Heights' code provision for 
single-family zoning) and was bordered by single-family houses. 
In 1970 the Order decided to utilize the fifteen acre tract for low and 
moderate income housing. It sought a non-profit developer familiar with 
federal housing subsidy procedures.6 Respondent Metropolitan Housing 
Development Corporation (MHDC) was chosen to develop the site and 
• Dean and Professor of Law, BOBton College Law School. The author acknowledges 
with gratitude and respect the research and writing assistance of Messrs. John Smitka and 
Peter Zuk in the preparation of this chapter. 
§ 15.1. I 426 U.S. 229 (1976), 
• Id. at 242. 
I 429 U.S. 252 (1977), 
• Id. at 255. 
• See 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (1976). 
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was given a lease with an option to purchase the tract. MHDC then 
petitioned for rezoning of the tract to R-5 (the village's zoning classifica-
tion for multiple-family cluster housing). After three public meetings on 
the proposed rezoning, the village rejected the MHDC petition. The 
reasons cited by the village were essentially the same as those presented 
during the ensuing legal struggle: (1) the property owners who bordered 
the fifteen acre tract bought in reliance on the immutability of R-3 
(single-family) zoning; (2) if the tract was rezoned to R-5 there would 
be a drop in the value of the surrounding property; and (3) R-5 zoning 
in the village was designed to serve as a "buffer" between R-3 zoning 
and commerciaVmanufacturing zones which were not present in the 
vicinity of the proposed development. 1 
MHDC and three individual plaintiffs sued the village in federal 
court.7 In 1974, the federal district court held that the refusal to rezone 
the tract (1) was not motivated by racial discrimination; (2) was a 
reasonable plan to protect property values; and (3) was a reasonable way 
to maintain the prevailing zoning plan in light of the preceding. 8 
The Court of Appeals reversed and held that while the findings of the 
district court were valid, the "ultimate effect" of the zoning plan was 
racially discriminatory.' The court ruled that the motivation of the vil-
lage in refusing to rezone was immaterial, and that the strict scrutiny 
test was to be applied if a discriminatory effect flowed from the refusal 
to rezone the land." The fact that a greater percentage of blacks than 
whites were adversely affected by the action did not in itself call for the 
test. 11 However, the court of appeals interpreted Kennedy Park Homes 
v. City of Lackawanna11 as requiring rezoning if the "historical context 
and ultimate effect" so warrant. 11 Focusing on the ultimate effect, plus 
the fact that Arlington Heights had no alternate plans for providing low 
and moderate income housing, the court of appeals felt compelled to 
employ strict scrutiny. Neither the "protection of property value" argu-
ment nor the reasonableness of the "buffer" use of R-5 zoning could 
qualify as a compelling state interest under the test. The court therefore 
reversed the decision of the district court.J4 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the discriminatory effect 
1 429 U.S. at 258. 
7 373 F. Supp. 208 (N.D. ru. 1974). 
1 Id. at 211. 
' 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975). 
•• Id. at 413. Eligibiliiy for the proposed housing was based on income. Although blacks 
constituted only eighteen per cent of the Metropolitan Chicago population, they com-
prised forty per cent of the J¥1pulation which would be eligible for the housing. 
II Id. 
II 436 F.2d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 1970). 
•.• 517 F.2d at 413. 
•• Id. at 415. 
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of the lack of low and moderate income housing was insufficient to 
invoke a remedy under the equal protection clause. 15 Relying on 
Washington v. Davis, the Court required proof of a racially discrimina-
tory purpose behind the refusal to rezone." Davis did not mandate that 
a racially discriminatory purpose be the dominant or primary concern 
of the regulation under attack, bu't such purpose must be shown to have 
been a motivating factorY Once this is shown, the usual "judicial defer-
ence" to the legislature's balancing of interests is no longer justified, and 
strict scrutiny is invoked. 
The Court distinguished between the case in Arlington Heights, which 
did not contain evidence of discriminatory purpose, and a case which 
might involve an unlawful discriminatory motivation. The Court hy-
pothesized: "[l]f the property involved here always had been zoned R-
5 but suddenly was changed to R-3 when the town learned of MHDC's 
plans to erect integrated housing, we would have a far different case."18 
The village's decision not to rezone was sustained because it had 
adopted its zoning policies well in advance of MHDC's challenge and 
because it had consistently applied its zoning policies in the past. 11 The 
Court thus held that respondents did not carry their burden of proving 
racially discriminatory purpose in the village's failure to rezone.20 
The Court noted, however, that the statutory issue of whether the 
village's actions violated the Fair Housing Act21 was never decided by 
the lower courts.22 The case was remanded to the court of appeals for 
resolution of this issue.23 
Upon remand, the Seventh Circuit held that the standard of review 
used in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196424 was to be applied to 
the Fair Housing Act. Under this standard, discriminatory effect is the 
primary factor to be weighed, rather than a racially discriminatory pur-
•• 429 U.S. at 270-71. 
II fd. at 264-65. 
17 ld. at 265-66. 
•• ld. at 267. 
•• Id. at 270. 
'"Id. 
•• 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1976). The Fair Housing Act, Title VIII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1968, was designed to eliminate racial discrimination in the rental or sale of housing 
(dwelling). A "dwelling" includes vacant land which is for sale or rent. This latter provi-
sion creates a means of challenging "exclusionary zoning" practices, such as those which 
were alleged to exist in Arlington Heights. 
22 429 U.S. at 271. 
23 ld. 
u 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976). Title Vll, an effort to achieve equality of employ-
ment opportunity, has been interpreted by the Supreme Court as invalidating employ-
ment practices which create a racially discriminatory effect without the requirement of a 
showing of discriminatory intent. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-39, 246-48 
(1976). 
3
Huber: Chapter 15: Zoning and Land Use
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 2012
308 1977 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSE'l'TS LAW §15.2 
pose. 25 The court of appeals held that the village's refusal to rezone 
would violate the Act if no other land properly zoned and suitable for 
such housing was available in Arlington Heights.21 The court then re-
manded the case to the district court for a determination of this issue. 
As of the date of this writing, the final resolution of the Arlington 
Heights' controversy has not been determined. It appears, however, that 
the exclusionary zoning issue has prompted two standards of review: 
The constitutional standard as expressed in the Supreme Court's deci-
sions in Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights, where discrimina-
tory intent must be shown, and the statutory standard of Trafficante v. 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. 27 and the Seventh Circuit on remand 
in Arlington Heights, where a discriminatory effect is all that need be 
shown. While the constitutional standard appears settled, the applica-
tion of statutory standard is not certain. The Seventh Circuit held on 
remand that the Fair Housing Act required the village to allocate some 
land for low and moderate income housing, but it appears that the 
village could still refuse to rezone the particular fifteen acre tract in 
question so long as an alternate site was available.28 
The Supreme Court's decision in Arlington Heights reserves judicial 
equal protection remedies for those zoning cases where an undefined 
measure of "racially discriminatory purpose" can be proven. This stan-
dard does little to prevent a town which has had zoning ordinances on 
its books for years and which has applied them with a measure of con-
sistency from continuing to keep racial minorities out of their territorial 
limits. This is true because discriminatory effect, even if obvious, is 
insufficient to invoke strict scrutiny. Only if a town is found to have 
engaged in conduct motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose will 
it be required to come forward with a compelling interest with which it 
may justify the disproportionate racial impact of its action. Similarly, 
under the Seventh Circuit's resolution of the Fair Housing Act issue, it 
appears that a town may lawfully refuse to rezone a particular parcel if 
there is available for development other land which is zoned for the kind 
of housing which meets the needs of low and moderate income persons. 
Thus if some other land is "available," a term not well-defined, a devel-
oper cannot rely on the equal protection clause or the Fair Housing Act 
to force a town to rezone his particular parcel. 
§ 15.2. Zoning: Special Permits: Conditions Imposed for Furtber-
ence of Social Goals. A special permit granting authority may only 
grant such permits as are expressly authorized by a zoning ordinance. 
Its commission is not a roving one to remedy all evils which might be 
21 558 F.2d 1283, 1289 (7th Cir. 1977). 
• Id. at 1294. 
Z7 409 u.s. 205 (1972). 
'" 558 F.2d at 1295. 
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corrected through the zoning power; it is subject to definite limitations.• 
These limitations apply even when a legislative body, such as a board 
of selectment, holds permit granting authority. This is because the body 
acts in such an instance in an administrative, rather than legislative, 
capacity. Generally a permit granting authority is empowered to attach 
conditions to a grant of a special permit.2 A condition is properly im-
posed when it does not offend the provisions of an ordinance or by-law 
but is reasonably calculated to protect adjacent land and achieve a 
legitimate objective of the zoning ordinance or by-law.3 
Furthermore, it is not the function of land use controls to remedy evils 
outside the scope of zoning ordinances, even when such problems are 
closely related to land use. Thus, a condition in a special permit regulat-
ing an applicant's business is invalid if not within the proper scope of 
land use control! During the 1977 Survey year the Supreme Judicial 
Court considered the question of whether the laudable objective of in-
creasing the availability of low-income and elderly housing may be 
achieved through the special permit device. 
In Middlesex & Boston Street Railway Company v. Board of Alder-
men of Newton, 5 the defendant Board of Aldermen, acting in its 
capacity as the special permit authority under a Newton ordinance, 
granted a special permit to the plaintiff to erect a fifty-four unit garden 
apartment development. Two conditions attached to the permit, how-
ever, were challenged by the plaintiff; one required the removal of all 
solid waste from the site at the owner's expense, and the other required 
the plaintiff to lease to the Newton Housing Authority (NHA) five units 
for use in its federally subsidized housing program at rates far lower 
than plaintiff intended to charge.8 In an appeal to the superior court 
under former G.L. c. 40A, section 21/ plaintiff alleged that the condi-
tions imposed by the Board were in excess of its authority and asked 
that bo~h conditions be annulled. After a hearing, the superior court 
made detailed findings of fact, concluded that both conditions were 
§ 15.2. 1 ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING (2d Edition 1976) § 19.09. 
• For a case stating that former G.L. c. 40A, § 4 contemplates conditions attached to a 
special permit, see Dowd v. Board of Appeals of Dover, 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 231, 
360 N.E.2d 640. The relevant section under the new Act is G.L. c. 40A, § 9. 
• ANDERSON, supra n.1 at § 19.30. Just as the imposition of conditions is limited, there 
are ordinances under which it is mandatory. Hence, in the latter case, the issuance of a 
permit without conditions is invalid. /d. at § 19.29. 
• Id. at § 19.31; see also Annotation, 99 A.L.R.2d 227 (1965). 
• 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 231, 359 N.E.2d 1279. 
• I d. at 232, n.3, 359 N .E.2d at 1280, n.3. The leasing condition required plaintiff to lease 
to the NHA one-bedroom units for $180 per month and two-bedroom units for $202 per 
month. Plaintiff rented apartments in the same development for $425 per month for a orie 
bedroom unit and $475 per month for a two bedroom unit. 
7 The appeal was brought under the former chapter 40A, The Zoning Enabling Act; the 
applicable section under the new Act is G.L. c. 40A, § 17. 5
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valid, and dismissed the appeal. This decision was in turn appealed to 
the Supreme Judicial Court, which affirmed in part and reversed in 
part. 
With regard to the waste removal condition, the plaintiff argued that 
since no other owners of a completed apartment building in Newton had 
been required to dispose of solid waste from the building site at their 
own expense, to require it to do so was invidiously discriminatory, arbi-
trary, capricious, a denial of equal protection of the laws, and a taking 
of property without compensation. 8 The Court noted that these claims 
were impressive in the abstract, but it found the record lacking in facts 
adequate to support them. Thus the Court held that the plaintiff had 
failed to sustain its burden of proof in seeking to overturn this aspect of 
the Board's action. 1 
The Court was more sympathetic to the plaintiffs objection to the 
condition that required it to lease units to the City for use as subsidized 
housing. The Court held that the Board did not possess the power to 
impose this condition to the special permit even though the General 
Laws allow special permit granting boards to issue permits subject to 
appropriate safeguards and conditions.10 The Court distinguished be-
tween a valid grant of a special permit to an applicant and the imposi-
tion on an applicant of a special condition as part of the special permit. 
The Court could find no language in the statute or the Newton zoning 
ordinance expressly authorizing the imposition of this condition.11 The 
Court then explored other possible sources of authority which might 
validate the Board's action. 
The Court could find no authority in the Home Rule Amendment, 12 
1 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 233-34, 359 N.E.2d at 1281. 
• I d. at 234, 359 N .E.2d at 1281. The superior court had stated: 
Condition seven [the rubbish removal condition] is clearly related to the purposes 
of zoning, namely "to facilitate the adequate provision of public requirements" (c. 
40A, § 3) and is therefore .a valid condition. Plaintiffs allege that the imposition of 
this condition on them alone amounts to a denial of equal protection. Evidence at 
trial indicated that the board is not singling out plaintiffs and imposing this condi· 
tion on them alone. Rather, the board is instituting a new policy and plaintiffs are 
among the ftret to come within the new policy. Since the action of the board is not 
irrational or arbitrary in this case and is validly related to a legitimate purpose, it 
would not be found to violate· the equal protection clause. [Citing Railway Ex-
preBB Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949).] ld. at 234, 359 N.E.2d 
at 1281. 
Therefore, there was not an arbitrary act, but a new policy. The Court could not find 
evidence to support a conclusion that the imposed condition violated the plaintiffs consti-
tutional rights or that the imposition of this condition to a special permit exceeded the 
Board's power, 1977 MaBB. Adv. Sh. at 234-35, 359 N.E.2d at 1281. 
11 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 236, 359 N.E.2d at 1282. Former G.L. c. 40A, § 4. The parallel 
provision under the new Act is G.L. c. 40A, § 9. 
11 /d. at 239, 359 N .E.2d at 1283. 
11 MASS. CoNST. AMEND. art. IT. Section 8 of the amendment reserves to the General 
6
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by which the City attempted to support its low-income and elderly hous-
ing permit condition. The Court stated that the General Court, through 
section 8 of the Home Rule Amendment, had occupied the zoning field 
for all cities and towns; this pre-emption negated any implied power in 
the municipality .13 The Court held alternatively that the type of munici-
pal, function that the amendment applies to is legislative, and thus 
could not be exercised by the Board of Aldermen when sitting as a 
permit granting authority .14 
The Court rejected the Board's principal claim that its condition was 
justified by the general public welfare language contained in the Zoning 
Enabling Act. 15 The Board also stressed the general welfare language in 
conjunction with some of the specific powers and duties the Act con-
ferred upon municipalities, such as lessening congestion, conserving 
health, preventing overcrowded development, encouraging the most 
appropriate use of land, and increasing amenities.•• Since Massachu-
setts case law interprets G.L. c. 40A as an affirmative measure to alle-
viate housing shortages for low-income and elderly persons, 17 the Board 
argued, there was no constitutional obstacle to the imposition of the 
condition and, therefore, it was valid. 
The Court did not question the municipality's power to expend public 
funds for low-income and elderly housing. The Court held, however, that 
the administrative board authorized to pass on applications for special 
permits under the zoning ordinance was without power to make the 
policy decision committing the municipality to a program of low-income 
and elderly housing, and could not exact or compel a contribution to the 
cost of such a program from the plaintiff as a special permit applicant. 18 
Court "the power to act in relation to cities and towns, but only by general laws which 
apply alike to all cities, or to all towns, or to all cities and towns." Section 6 provides that 
"[a]ny city or town may, by the adoption, amendment, or repeal of local ordinances or 
by-laws, exercise any power or function which the general court has the power to confer 
upon it, which is not inconsistent with the constitution or laws enacted by the general 
court in conformity with powers reserved to the general court by section eight . . . . " 
13 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 240, 359 N.E.2d at 1283. 
1
' Id. 
11 Former G.L. c. 40A, § 2 (as amended by Acts of 1959, c. 607) authorized cities and 
towns to adopt zoning regulations "[f]or the purpose of promoting the health, safety, 
convenience, morals or welfare of [their] inhabitants." See also G.L. c. 40A, § 3 (as 
amended by Acts of 1975, c. 808, § 3). 
11 Former G.L. c. 40A, § 3. 
17 The statutory scheme confirming the affirmative power of zoning to meet such hous-
ing shortages includes G.L. cc. 40A, 40B, and 121B. 
18 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 241-42, 359 N.E.2d at 1284. The Court based its decision on 
its reading and application of the Zoning Enabling Act, G.L. c. 40A, and the Newton 
Zoning ordinance. Id. at 242, 359 N.E.2d at 1284. It did not reach the question of whether 
the low-income and elderly housing conditions would be constitutionally permissible if 
authorized by the General Court in the Zoning Enabling Act, supra, or by operation of 
7
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The Court determined that the plaintiff was not barred from obtain-
ing relief because of waiver or estoppel since he had completed the 
construction of fifty-four dwelling units and pursued his appeal concur-
rently. At all times he had asserted his intention to do so. Additionally, 
the Board did not set up these defenses affirmatively in any of their 
answers as required by Mass. R. Civ. P. S(c). Equally important in the 
Court's view was the fact that the Board had implicitly acknowledged 
and sanctioned the plaintiff's action by including a termination clause 
in two leases of units to the Newton Housing Authority that would 
operate in the event the low-income and elderly housing condition were 
invalidated by the courts." 
The plaintiff, however, was not allowed damages against either the 
Board or individual board members in the amount of lost rents and 
profits on the low-income units.20 
Thus, the Court forbade the use of a condition to a special permit in 
a fashion not specifically authorized by the zoning statute and ordi-
nance in question. The case makes clear that the decision to pursue 
general goals such as subsidized housing, while closely related to land-
use control, lies within the purview of legislative bodies, and not permit-
granting administrative agencies. 
§15.3. Special Permits: Not-For-Profit Clubs in Residential 
Areas: Spot Zoning. The growth in recent years of widespread interest 
in various recreational pursuits requiring special facilities• has opened 
a market for the construction of these facilities in locations readily ac-
cessible to users. During the 1977 Survey year, the Supreme Judicial 
Court decided the issue of the appropriateness of privately-owned tennis 
facilities in a residential zone. 
In Kiss v. Board of Appeals of Longmeadow2 two separate clubs which 
were not operated for profit obtained special permits in August, 1974 for 
the use of land located in a residential zone for the construction of 8-
the Home Rule Amendment. MASS CONST. AMEND. arts. n, LXXXIX.Id. Nor did it reach 
an argument by the board in favor of non-Euclidean zoning. ld. See Euclid v. Ambler 
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
1
' ld. at 244, 359 N .E.2d at 1265. 
• I d. at 245, 359 N .E.2d at 1285-86. There was no fmding that members of the board 
had acted in bad faith; therefore they were immune to liability to the plaintiff for their 
erroneous imposition of the condition. See Gildea v. Ellershaw, 363 Mass. 800, 820, 298 
N.E.2d 847, 858-59 (1973). There was no basis for imposing liability on the members of 
the board or the city. See Sherman v. Rent Control Board of Brookline, 367 MaBB. 1, 6-7, 
323 N.E.2d 730, 733 (1975). 
§ 15.3. 1 Such recreational pursuite include tennis, racquetball, squash, and swim-
ming. 
1 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2355, 355 N.E.2d 461. 
8
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court indoor tennis facilities. 3 Plaintiff Kiss entered separate complaints 
in the superior court appealing the grant of each of the permits. Plain-
tiffs Graziana and Diamond filed a single complaint in the same court 
challenging only the grant that had been extended to Shine. All three 
cases were transferred to the Housing Court of Hampden County! The 
cases were tried before the same judge in two separate trials, and were 
the subject of a single decision affirming the Board of Appeals' grant of 
special permits.• Plaintiffs then appealed to the Supreme Judicial 
Court. 
Defendant Shapiro had been granted a special permit for the use of 
6.843 acres of a 15.227 acre parcel owned by him for a tennis facility. 
Defendant Shine had contracted to purchase approximately forty acres 
of land, and had been granted a special permit to use eleven acres of 
that land for a tennis facility. All the land that was the subject of the 
permits was zoned A-2 under the zoning by-law of the town of Longmea-
dow.• 
The A-2 classification represents the most restricted residential zone 
in the town. As a matter of right, it permits single family residences and 
certain civic uses: church, religious or denominational educational 
buildings, public school, library, museum, park, playground or recrea-
tional buildings, and municipal buildings and facilities. The Longmea-
dow Board of Appeals had discretionary authority to grant, subject to 
appropriate conditions, special permits for specified uses, including use 
for a "club not conducted for profit."7 
The applications of the defendants specified that their respective ten-
nis facilities would be operated as nonprofit clubs. Mter proper notice 
was given, a public hearing on the applications was held as required by 
law.8 The special permits were granted subject to substantial sets of 
conditions and safeguards governing use of the tennis facilities. • 
• Id. at 2355-56, 355 N.E.2d at 463. The Meadows Racquet Club special permit was 
granted to Leo J. Shapiro, Shephard Cohen, and Leo Grillo. The Longmeadow Racquet 
Club, Inc. special permit was granted to Philip J. Shine. 
• See G.L. c. 185B, § 22 (repealed by Acts of 1978, c. 478, § 91). 
• 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2356, 355 N.E.2d at 463. The housing court entered judgment 
in the three cases separately. 
• ld. at 2358, 355 N.E.2d at 464. 
7 Zoning By-Law, rown of Longmeadow, art. N, § B, cl. 6.2. 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 
2359, 355 N .E.2d at 464. 
• The proceedings in this case took place at all relevant times, prior to the appeal, before 
the effective date of the new Zoning Act. Thus, the older Act was applied: Former G.L. c. 
40A, § 4 contained the requirements of a hearing, and former G.L. c. 40A, § 17 contained 
notice provisions. Under the new Zoning Act the parallel provisions are contained in G.L. 
c. 40A, § 9, for hearing, and § 15, for notice. 
• 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2359-60 n.3, 355 N.E.2d at 465 n.3. Perhaps the most signifi-
cant condition which was imposed was one making the special permit effective only for 
9
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Appealing from the decision in the housing court, the plaintiffs con-
tended that the Board exceeded its authority in granting the special 
permits in several ways: (1) since there was nothing expressly covering 
the use similar to the character of a tennis facility within the zoning by-
law, an exception could not be granted for a tennis facility, and thus the 
permits were invalid; (2) the so-called "clubs not conducted for profit" 
were indeed conducted for profit; (3) the permits constituted spot zon-
ing; (4) the Board's failure to file with the town clerk its rules for con-
ducting its business made its grant of the permits invalid; (5) certain of 
the Board's conditions and safeguards on the permits improperly dele-
gated Board functions to the planning board; and (6) the chairman of 
the Board, a lawyer and a member of the firm that represented the 
estate of one of the sellers of the Shine parcel, improperly took part in 
the decisions.10 
Regarding the character of the tennis facilities; the Court held that 
explicit reference in a zoning by-law to a use similar to the requested 
exception was not the proper test for the validity of the permits. 11 
Rather, the Court deemed the relevant considerations to be whether the 
special permit would be in harmony with the general purpose and intent 
of the zoning by-law. 12 The Court emphasized that the Board's decisions 
had themselves taken note of the widespread citizen interest in tennis, 
the lack of indoor tennis facilities in the town, and how the public 
welfare and convenience would be served by the proposed facilities. 13 
Additionally, the board had noted the presence of several golf, tennis, 
and swimming facilities in the Residence A-2 zone. 14 The Court found 
so long as the facilities were run by "clubs not conducted for profit." Each of the clubs 
was a corporation organized under G.L. c. 180. 
11 ld. at 2361-69, 355 N.E.2d at 465-69. 
11 Id. at 2361, 355 N.E.2d at 465. Former G.L. c. 40, § 4 stated: 
A zoning ordinance or by-law may provide that exceptions may be allowed to the 
regulations and restrictions contained therein, which shall be applicable to all of 
the districts of a particular claBB and of a character set forth in such ordinance or 
by-law. Such exceptions shall be in harmony with the general purpose and intent 
of the ordinance or by-law and may be subject to general or specific rules therein 
contained. The board of appeals estalished under section fourteen of such city or 
town, ... may, in appropriate cases and subject to appropriate conditions and 
safeguards, grant to an applicant a special permit to make use of his land or to erect 
and maintain buildings or other structures thereon in accordance with such an 
exception. 
The Board had the power under former G.L. c. 40A, § 15(2) "[t]o hear and decide 
applications for special permits for exceptions as provided in section four upon which such 
board is required to paSB." Parallel provisions are contained in the new Zoning Act, G .L. 
c. 40A at§ 9, pertaining to the criteria for special permits, and § 14(2), detailing the board 
of appeals' power to decide applications for special permits. 
12 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2363, 355 N.E.2d at 466. 
•• I d. at 2362-63, 355 N .E.2d at 466 . 
•• ld. 
10
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these facts adequate to support the Board's conclusion that the special 
permits would be in harmony with the general purposes of the by-law. 
The Court held that the similar findings of the trial court were adequate 
to support the conclusion that the use permitted by the special permits 
was within the scope of both the applicable statutes and the town's by-
law.t5 
The Court reiterated the difference between the grant of a variance 
and of a special permit, and emphasized that the criteria for a special 
permit are less stringent than those for a variance. •• The Court also 
commented that it would not review the wisdom of the Board's action, 
which the plaintiff had attacked, but only its validity. 17 
In holding that the clubs in question were indeed "clubs not con-
ducted for profit" of the type contemplated by the zoning by-law, 18 the 
Court indicated that the plaintiffs had placed improper reliance on the 
case of Carpenter v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Framingham. •• In 
Carpenter the trial judge had found that the purported club was '·'not a 
bona fide club and therefore . . . not an accepted use under the section 
of the zoning by-laws."28 That case involved a supposed swimming club 
whose by-laws permitted anyone to come off the street and use the 
swimming pool. Here, on the contrary, the evidence indicated that the 
tennis clubs were of the type contemplated by the by-law.21 
The Court found no merit in the contention that the grant of the 
special permits constituted spot-zoning.22 The Court explained that the 
Longmeadow by-law itself contemplated that land classified as residen-
tial could be used for a "club not conducted for profit," with the Board 
of Appeals having discretion to grant the permit. 23 The action of the 
board did not reclassify the land or in any way amend the by-law with 
II Jd. 
" Id. at 2362, 355 N.E.2d at 466, citing Josephs v. Board of Appeals of Brookline, 362 
Mass. 290, 291-95, 285 N.E.2d 436 (1972); Moore v. Cataldo, 356 Mass. 325, 327-28, 249 
N.E.2d 578, 580-81 (1969); Wrona v. Board of Appeals of Pittsfield, 338 Mass. 87, 88-90, 
153 N.E.2d 631, 633 (1958); Todd v. Board of Appeals of Yarmouth, 337 Mass. 162, 167-
68, 148 N.E.2d 380, 384 (1958); Lawrence v. Board of Appeals of Lynn, 336 MaBS. 87,89-
90, 142 N.E.2d 378, 381 (1957); Carson v. Board of Appeals of Lexington, 321 MaBB. 649, 
652-55, 75 N.E.2d 116, 117-19 (1947). 
17 I d. at 2362, 355 N .E.2d at 466. 
18 Jd. at 2364-65, 355 N.E.2d at 467. 
11 352 MaBB. 54, 223 N.E.2d 679 (1967). 
21 I d. at 56, 223 N .E.2d at 681. 
Zl Jd, 
zz 1976 MaBS. Adv. Sh. at 2365, 355 N.E.2d at 467. This specific iBBue had not been 
decided in Massachusetts but the Court noted, with extensive citations, that special 
permits have been held not to be spot zoning in other jurisdictions. Id. at 2365-66, 355 
N.E.2d at 467-68. "As a special permit is not an amendment, it cannot constitute spot 
zoning." 3 ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAw OF ZONING, § 19.04 (1976). 
Z3 ld. 
11
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respect to the uses permitted; the Board had merely exercised the dis-
cretionary power which had been delegated to it. 
The contention that the board had failed to file its rules with the town 
clerk as required by the Zoning Enabling Act was rejected on the ground 
that the rule was directory and not mandatory.24 As to the plaintiffs' 
delegatiqr argument, the Court indicated that it might have preferred 
that the Board of Appeals not have ordered that building plans, off-
street parking, buffer areas and other similar details be approved by 
a majority of the planning board as well as a majority of the Board of 
Appeals.25 However, this did not constitute an improper delegation of 
the Board's authority to the planning board under the standards set out 
in Weld v. Board of Appeals of Gloucester.21 In Weld the Board had 
merely indicated its intent to grant a special permit at a future date 
upon the occurrence of a contingency. In the present case, the planning 
board approval was a proper "condition and safeguard" within the 
Board of Appeals' statutory authority. Thus, in Kiss "[t]he board did 
not abdi~ate its powers as it appears to have done in the Weld case."27 
The Court further held that the action of the Board was not invalida-
ted because its chairman, who had an interest in one of the parcels 
under consideration, advised the Board as to legal precedent after hav-
ing withdrawn from deliberations regarding the application relating to 
that parcel. 28 
The Court affirmed the judgment of the Hampden Housing Court in 
both cases insofar as it had affirmed the Board's granting of the permits, 
but held that the lower court had erred in "dismissing" plaintiffs' ac-
tions.21 
§ 15.4. Variance: Airport Extension: Effect of Official Approval. 
During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court was faced with a 
case in which a landowner using property in a very specialized fashion, 
an airport, attempted to extend his runway use without seeking the 
appropriate approval, a zoning variance. In Building Inspector of Lan-
caster v. Sanderson, 1 the defendant-owner attempted, to justify his un-
authorized extension of a runway, which use required a variance from 
Lancaster's zoning ordinance, upon the state's regulatory approval of his 
airport and the fact that the land had been purchased from the state 
with the approval of the Lancaster Board of Selectmen. 
Prior to 1969, the defendant owned and operated an airport located 
2
' ld. at 2367, 355 N.E.2d at 468. 
21 ld. at 2368, 355 N.E.2d at 468-69. 
• 345 Mass. 376, 187 N.E.2d 854 (1963). 
21 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2368, 355 N.E.2d at 468. 
• ld. at 2369, 355 N.E.2d at 469. 
21 ld. at 2370, 355 N.E.2d at 469. 
§15.4. 1 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 479, 360 N.E.2d 1051. 
12
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entirely within the town of Shirley.2 In 1969, he purchased from the 
Commonwealth a parcel of land in Lancaster which abutted the Shirley 
property. 3 The land had been previously classified residential or 
residential-recreational.• In 1970, the Lancaster Zoning Board of Ap-
peals granted the defendant a variance authorizing the extension of his 
airport runway from the Shirley town line for a distance of 600 feet 
southerly on the Lancaster property acquired from the Commonwealth.5 
Sometime between 1970 and 1974 the defendant further extended the 
same runway southerly on the same parcel of land an additional dist-
ance of 1400 feet without obtaining any variance or other permit from 
the town.• In 1974, he did apply to the Board of Appeals for a variance 
covering the additional new runway, but the Board denied his request. 
From this denial he took no appeaJ.7 The defendant did obtain annual 
certificates of approval for his airport from the Massachusetts Aeronau-
tics Commission as required by law.8 The certificate for 1974-1975 stated 
a runway length of 3,660 feet and the 1975-1976 certificate stated 2,460 
feet. Certificates previously filed did not state any runway length.u 
The Lancaster building inspector brought suit to enjoin use of the 
additional runway space in violation of the town's zoning by-law. The 
superior court entered judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant 
appealed. 
The Supreme Judicial Court found that the findings of fact by the 
' trial court were not "clearly erroneous, "10 and that the Town was not 
estopped from enforcing its zoning by-law because of an alleged repre-
sentation by the chairman of the Lancaster Board of Selectmen to a 
member of the legislature that the Board had favored the purchase of 
land from the state for the runway extension. 11 
2 Id. at 480, 360 N.E.2d at 1052. 
3 ld. 
• Id. 
• ld. at 480, 360 N.E.2d at 1052-53. 
• Id. at 480-81, 360 N.E.2d at 1053. 
7 Id. at 480, 360 N.E.2d at 1053. 
• G.L. c. 90, § 39B. 
• 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 480-81, 360 N.E.2d at 1052-53. 
" Because the findings of fact were based largely on oral testimony, they were consid-
ered in light of Mass. R. Civ. P. 52(a), 365 Mass. 816 (1974), which states: "[f]indings of 
fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." For discussion of 
the Massachusetts standard as compared to the federal one, see 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 
482-84, 360 N.E.2d at 1053-54. 
11 I d. at 488, 360 N .E.2d at 1056. The Court reached this conclusion by first noting that 
the record did not state that estoppel had been affirmatively pleaded by the defendant 
as required under Mass. R. Civ. P. 8(c), 365 Mass. 749 (1974). Inexplicably, the pleadings 
before the trial court were not a part of the record. Even if estoppel had been affirmatively 
pleaded, the Court has consistently held that a municipality cannot ordinarily be es-
13
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At the root of the defendant's case was the claim that the land in 
question should have been exempt from the Lancaster zoning by-law for 
two reasons: the extended runway was a continuing nonconforming 
use, 12 and the operation of an airport is the discharge of a public func-
tion.13 
Because the state owned the runway land before the passage of the 
Lancaster zoning by-law, the defendant claimed it was exempt from the 
zoning by-law, at least to the extent that the by-law might interfere with 
or prevent the use of the land by the Commonwealth in the accomplish-
ment of its legitimate· functions. 14 The Court assumed this premise to 
be correct. The defendant then claimed that at the time the Common-
wealth still owned the land he made surveys and appraisals on it and 
applied to the State Aeronautics Commission for a certificate to use the 
land as a runway. He asserted that these acts "were part of the state's 
use"15 and that his acts were those of an agent of the Massachusetts 
Aeronautics Commission before he became the owner of the land. The 
Court rejected this contention because it was unsupported by the facts, 18 
and stated additionally that there was nothing in the record to warrant 
or permit a finding of agency status in the defendant. 
The Court also found unpersuasive the argument that the use of the 
land was exempt from the by-law because airport use constitutes a 
public function, and that the towns of Shirley and Lancaster could have 
joined in the establishment of an airport commission. 17 Once again, the 
defendant relied on the contention that he was an agent of the Common-
wealth. The Court found his status to be that of a private entrepreneur 
only .18 The Court held that the holding of a license required by law as a 
condition to the operation of a business does not itself permit the licen-
see to operate the business in a place where it contravenes zoning by-
laws or ordinances." 
topped by the acts of its officers from ·enforcing its zoning by-law or ordinance. See 1977 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 484-88, 360 N.E.2d at 1054-55. In any event, the trial judge had made 
no findings on this subject; the defendant had not exhausted his opportunity under Mass. 
R. Civ. P. 52(b), 365 Mass. 817 (1974) to request that he do so; and the Court concluded 
that the facts as it understood them on appeal would not require a holding that the town 
was estopped from enforcing the zoning by-law against the defendant. 
11 See G.L. c. 40A, § 5. Under the new Zoning Act, see G.L. c. 40A, § 6. 
13 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 489-91, 360 N.E.2d at 1056-57. 
14 See Medford v. Marinucci Bros. & Co., 344 Mass. 50, 54-56, 181 N.E.2d 584, 587-88 
(1962). 
11 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 489, 360 N.E.2d at 1056. 
11 Id. at 489, 360 N.E.2d at 1056. Again, the defendant failed to avail himself of the 
opportunity to request that the trial judge make additional findings of fact under Mass. 
R. Civ. P. 52(b), 365 Mass. 817 (1974). 
17 G.L. c. 90, § 51N. 
11 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 490, 360 N.E.2d at 1057. 
11 The Court cited Pratt v. Building Inspector of Gloucester, 330 Mass. 344, 345, 113 
14
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The result reached by the Court was a sound one, especially in light 
of facts tending to show that the defendant's arguments were no more 
than attempts to subsequently justify an unauthorized extension of his 
use. 28 Owners would be well advised by this decision that in a case where 
both land use and regulatory approval are necessary to operate in a 
desired fashion on land, the official approval of all applicable authorities 
must be sought and obtained before use. 
§15.5. Land Use Legislation: Precedence over Local Zoning. 
During the Survey year, one case appeared which could reduce the 
power of regulation by local zoning laws over areas of ecological concern. 
In Island Properties, Inc. v. Martha's Vineyard Comm., 1 the plaintiff 
proposed to develop 507 acres of land in the town of Oak Bluffs on 
Martha's Vineyard.2 Definitive plans consistent with the town's by-laws 
were approved by the town planning board on June 7, 1974.3 Twenty 
days later, however, the General Court enacted and the Governor signed 
Acts of 1974, c. 637 (chapter 637) entitled "An Act protecting land 
and water on Martha's Vineyard."4 Enacted as an "emergency law,"• 
chapter 637 became effective immediately. • This legislation estab-
lished the Martha's Vineyard Commission-a "public body corporate" 
-composed of twenty-one members' and charged with ensuring "that 
henceforth the land usages which will be permitted are those which 
will not be unduly detrimental to . . . the economy of the island, 
... [nor destructive of the] unique natural, historical, ecological, sci-
entific, cultural and other values"• of Martha's Vineyard. To achieve 
these goals, the Commission is authorized to prescribe standards and 
criteria by which areas of the island can be designated as districts of 
N.E.2d 816 (1953). The Court noted that the converse is equally true, citing Davidson v. 
Selectment of Duxbury, 358 MaBB. 64, 66-68, 260 N.E.2d 695 (1970). 
• Certainly the fact that Sanderson had previously obtained one variance for airport 
runway use tends to show that he was aware of the procedures neceBBary for proper 
approval. 
§15.5. 1 1977 MBBB. Adv. Sh. 555, 361 N.E.2d 385. 
1 /d. at 556, 361 N .E.2d at 386. 
I /d. 
4 Jd. at 557, 361 N.E.2d at 386. 
• Acts of 1974, c. 637 (introduction). 
I G.L. c. 4, § 1. 
7 Acts of 1974, c. 637, § 2. 
• The Commission is composed of one selectman or municipal agent from each of the 
six towns on Martha's Vineyard appointed by the board of selectmen of each town, nine 
residents of the island at large with no more than two residents nor less than one resident 
from each town, four non-residents appointed by the governor without voting privileges, 
one county commiBBioner of Duke's County, and one member of the governor's cabinet. 
I d. 
1 /d. at § 1. 
15
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"critical planning concern" (CPC) and by which development proposals 
can be characterized as "developments of regional impact" (DRI).•• 
Once these criteria have been submitted to and approved by the Secre-
tary of Communities and Development, 11 the Commission is empowered 
to designate nominated portions of the island as CPC districts and to 
issue guidelines for the future development of those districts. 12 The 
towns in which these areas are located are then allowed to adopt new 
zoning and development regulations which conform to the issued guide-
lines, subject to fmal approval by the Commission.13 Should those towns 
fail to adopt conforming regulations the Commission is further author-
ized, after appropriate notice, to prescribe regulations for the town. 14 
These new regulations, whether drafted by the town or by the Commis-
sion, are to be administered by the towns as part of their by-laws. 15 
Local town authorities, in tum, are required to use the Commission's 
criteria in reviewing development plans submitted to them for ap-
proval.•• Those proposals which are characterized by town authorities as 
ORis must be referred to the Commission for further review. 17 The Com-
mission, after proper notice and public hearings, may either approve or 
disapprove the proposed DRI.11 In doing so, the Commission is required 
to consider the potential impact of the proposed development on areas 
outside of the immediately affected municipality}• Finally, local au-
thorities are prohibited from issuing development permits for proposals 
characterized as ORis without Commission authorization. 20 
On March 4, 1976, the Commission designated the "Oak Bluffs Senge-
kontacket Pond District" as a CPC.11 Plaintiff's property included 
eighty-seven percent of the land so designated. 22 As a result, plaintiff's 
" ld. at I 8. Prior to the formulation of these c.riteria, local authorities are precluded 
from granting permits for large scale developments. I d. at I 7. 
11 On September 8, 1976, the Secretary approved standards proposed by the Commis-
sion. 1977 Maaa. Adv. Sh. at 662, 361 N.E.2d at 388. 
11 Acts of 1974, c. 637, I 9. Prior to such designation, the Commission is required to give 
proper notice to all municipalities which include within their boundaries portions of the 
area to be designated a CPC district. The Commiuion must also give notice and conduct 
a public hearing pursuant to G.L. c. 30A, I 2.ld. 
11 ld. at I 11. 
14 ld. 
11 ld. 
11 Id. at I 14. 
17 ld. 
11 ld. at I 15. 
11 Id. at § 16. 
•Id. at §17. 
11 1977 Maaa. Adv. Sh. at 664, 361 N.E.2d at 389. The CommiBBion was organized on 
December 6, 1974. Approval of the standards and criteria occurred on September 8, 1976, 
and the moratorium on iuuance of permits terminated on October 23, 1976. ld. at 659, 
361 N .E.2d at 387. 
11 ld. at 664, 361 N.E.2d at 390. 
16
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proposed development which had been approved by town authorities 
prior to passage of chapter 637 was in violation of the zoning regulations 
of Oak Bluffs as revised by the Commission. 23 Plaintiff sought a declara-
tory judgment that his land would not be affected by these new regula-
tions, relying primarily on G.L. c. 40A, § 7A, which provides in relevant 
part: 
"provisions of the ordinance or by-law in effect at the time of the 
submission of the first submitted plan shall govern the land shown 
on [an] approved definitive plan, for a period of seven years from 
the date of endorsement of such approval notwithstanding any 
other provision of law . . . . " 
The plaintiff argued that this language prohibited the application not 
only of subsequently formulated ordinances or by-laws, but also of all 
subsequently formulated zoning laws. To the extent, therefore, that 
chapter 637 could be properly termed a "zoning law," the plaintiff 
claimed exemption from its effect.24 In support of this argument, the 
plaintiff cited language within chapter 637 itself. Paragraph 2 of section 
7 states that "[n]othing in this act shall be construed to prohibit the 
planning board of a town on Martha's Vineyard from approving any 
definitive subdivision plan . . . provided that such . . . plan was duly 
submitted to said planning board prior to the effective date of this 
act."26 The plaintiff contended that since his definitive plan had been 
properly approved by the local board prior to the effective date of chap-
ter 637, this approval was valid by the saving provision of chapter 637, 
section 7.28 
The Supreme Judicial Court refused to decide whether G.L. c. 40A, 
section 7 A controlled or was superseded by chapter 637. The Court 
rejected the plaintiff's interpretation of the new law and construed the 
language of each provision so as to achieve maximum consistency.27 The 
Court held that section 7 A "is not directed to subsequent zoning laws 
in a general sense, but only to zoning ordinances or by-laws subse-
quently passed by municipalities in the accustomed and ordinary 
way. "28 Regulations formulated by the Commission or in accordance 
with the Commission's guidelines are therefore unaffected by section 
,. Plaintiff originally proposed to divide the 507 acres into 850 building lots. 1977 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. at 556, 361 N .E.2d at 386. The revised regulations set a new density limit of one 
dwelling per 60,000 square feet of area, Id. at 564, 361 N.E.2d at 390, as well as other 
growth control measures. ld. at 565, 361 N .E.2d at 390. 
24 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 566-67, 361 N.E.2d at 391. 
21 Acts of 1974, c. 637, § 7, as amended by Acts of 1974, c. 759. 
10 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 571-72, 361 N.E.2d at 393. 
27 Id. at 567-71, 361 N.E.2d at 391-93. 
28 Id. at 568, 361 N.E.2d at 391 (emphasis added). 
17
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7A21 since chapter 637 "is a polar opposite from those subsequent local 
enactments contemplated by § 7A."30 Although the languge of chapter 
637, section 7 provides for local approval of development plans submit-
ted prior to July 27, 1974, the Court held that sections 10 and 15 of the 
Act impose additional barriers for areas designated as CPCs and for 
development plans characterized as DRis.31 While local approval would, 
therefore, continue to be the final step for most development proposals, 
those affecting CPCs or DRis would be subject to additional Commis-
sion scrutiny and possible rejection. 
In reaching this decision, the Court did not limit its consideration to 
the specific statutory language at issue, but was apparently influenced 
by what it saw as the ultimate goal of chapter 637. The Court stated, 
"It might be thought a perverse anomaly if [the] regional purposes [of 
chapter 637] could be thwarted, as to undeveloped resources requiring 
CPC or DRI status, by freezing and preserving for seven years preexist-
ing local by-laws with narrow orientation."32 The Court's action in this 
case thus appears to distinguish properly designated CPCs and DRis 
from zoning districts and development proposals in general by suggest-
ing that the former are governed by the provisions of chapter 637 alone. 
While the Court did not hold that chapter 637 actually supersedes prior 
zoning legislation, it did "not minimize [the] apparent force of this 
argument, considering the emergency nature and comprehensiveness of 
chapter 637 and the cogency of a legislative purpose to take into the 
statutory scheme all undeveloped land and water which plausibly re-
quired treatment as CPC districts or DRis."33 Therefore, other provi-
sions of the general laws that conflict with chapter 637 are not guaran-
teed continued vitality where CPCs or DRis are concerned simply by the 
clarity of their terms. While the Court has demonstrated a preference 
for salvatory construction, it has not ruled out the possibility of resolv-
ing statutory conflicts in favor of chapter 637 by means of protanto 
repeal. 
§15.6. Extent of Section 7A Protection: Amended Zoning 
Ordinances. A developer who believes his subdivision plan lies outside 
the subdivision control law may submit the plan to the planning board 
for its endorsement. Failure of the board to act on the plan within 
fourteen days entitles the developer to obtain from the town clerk certifi-
cation "that approval under the subdivision control law is not re-
quired."1 The plan is thus deemed to have been endorsed by the plan-
21 ld. at 571 n.23, 361 N.E.2d at 393 n.23. 
31 I d. at 569, 361 N .E.2d at 392. 
31 ld. at 572, 361 N.E.2d at 393. 
sz I d. at 569, 361 N .E.2d at 392. 
13 ld. at 571, 361 N.E.2d at 393. 
§15.6. I G.L. c. 41, § 81P. 18
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ning board. Prior to its repeal, section 7A of the Zoning Enabling Act2 
protected the use of land shown on such a statutorily approved plan 
from certain changes in local zoning ordinances. Thus, the laws in effect 
at the time of approval govern use of the land for three years from the 
date of planning board endorsement. 3 The one exception to this morato-
rium permits an increase in the number of permitted uses.4 
During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court further clarified 
the extent to which section 7A restricts a municipality's authority to 
regulate use of land endorsed by operation of section 81P. In Cape Ann 
Land Development Corp. v. City of Gloucester, 5 a landowner had sub-
mitted a perimeter plan in December, 1972 for endorsement that subdi-
vision approval was not required. The plan called for a shopping center 
in an area permitting such use. The planning board failed to act season-
ably, thereby endorsing it.• The city amended its zoning ordinance in 
May, 1973 in a way that precluded the building of a shopping center on 
plaintiff's land. In June, 1973, detailed regulations governing shopping 
center use were adopted. Those regulations required a special permit 
from the city council before a shopping center, a "major project," could 
be constructed. In August, 1973, the city refused the developer's appli-
cation for a building permit for the shopping center. 7 The board of 
appeals in turn rejected the developer's appeal from that denial. 
Plaintiff then filed an appeal from the denial of the building permit 
to the superior court. He then later amended the appeal to include a 
petition for declaratory relief. The declaratory relief sought was a deter-
mination of the effect of the amended zoning restrictions on Cape Ann's 
right to build the planned shopping center.8 The superior court consoli-
dated the declaratory judgment proceeding and appeal, and from its 
judgment both parties appealed directly to the Supreme Judicial 
Court.8 
The issue before the Court was the extent to which section 7 A pro-
tected the project from the city's 1973 zoning changes because of the 
perimeter plan's earlier statutory approval. 10 The Court initially noted 
2 Former G.L. c. 40A, § 7A. Almost identical language appears in the new Zoning Act. 
See G.L. c. 40A, § 6, sixth paragraph. For a discussion of the new Act, see Huber, Zoning 
and Land Use, 1976 ANN. SURv. MAss. LAW §§ 15.1-15.10. 
3 ld. 
'Id. 
• 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2180, 353 N.E.2d 645. 
1 G.L. c. 41, § 81P. 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2181, 353 N.E.2d at 645-46. 
7 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2181, 353 N.E.2d at 646. The landowner had not attempted 
to obtain a special permit, but sought a building permit instead. Id. 
• Id. at 2182, 353 N.E.2d at 646 . 
• ld. 
10 ld. 
19
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its holding in Bellows Farms, Inc. v. Building Inspector of Acton11 where 
it held that the three year protection of the section extended only to uses 
permitted under the zoning by-law and did not affect other provisions 
of the zoning by-law.13 Thus Bellows Farms held that a zoning change 
which became effective during the three year period governing the 
number of apartment units which could be constructed could be applied 
to the plaintiff's parcel because it did not forbid the use for apart-
ments.14 The Court repeated its Bellows Farms statement that section 
7A protection might encompass zoning changes which, though not di-
rectly affecting permissible uses, have the effect of nullifying the protec-
tion of section 7 A,t4 
The developer conceded that the June, 1973 shopping center regula-
tions applied to its parcel, but urged that such application was circum-
scribed in two respects. The first limitation urged upon the Court was 
that the regulations did not apply where they had the effect of practi-
cally prohibiting the shopping center use. The second limitation urged 
was that the newly applicable zoning provisions were invalid where they 
gave the city council discretion to deny a special permit. 15 
The Court noted that the superior court judge had retained jurisdic-
tion over the declaratory judgment proceeding pending city council ac-
tion on the special permit.11 The Court approved of this course17 and 
decided the case against this framework. 18 
The Court held that, for the duration of section 7 A protection, the city 
council could deny a special permit for failure to comply with those new 
shopping center regulations which do not practically prohibit the pro-
tected use, or for failure to comply with such additional requirements 
as the state sanitary code or city building code.1' The Court stated: 
"Section 7 A protects that [shopping center] use, and the protection of 
11 364 Mass. 253, 303 N.E.2d 728 (1973). 
11 Id. at 256, 303 N.E.2d at 730. 
13 I d. at 261-62, 303 N .E.2d at 732-33. In the Bellows Farms decision the Court engaged 
in an exhaustive inquiry into the legislative intent behind the amendment of section 7 A 
by Acts of 1963, c. 578, which provided that the use of land approved by operationofG.L. 
c. 41, § 81P was to be granted a limited exemption from the effects of subsequent zoning 
amendments, as opposed to earlier language, inserted by Acts of 1960, c. 291, exempting 
any lot so approved. The Court concluded that the change indicated a legislative intent 
to grant a more limited survival of pre-amendment rights under amended zoning ordi-
nances and by-laws.ld. at 258, 303 N.E.2d at 731. See also Perry v. Building Inspector of 
Nantucket, 1976 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 845, 851-53, 350 N.E.2d 733, 736-37. 
14 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2183, 353 N.E.2d at 646-47, citing Bellows Farms, 364 Mass. 
at 261, 303 N.E.2d at 733. 
11 Id. at 2183-85, 353 N.E.2d at 647. 
11 ld. at 2186, 353 N.E.2d at 647. 
17 
.Jd. at 2187, 353 N.E.2d at 648. 
18 ld. at 2186, 353 N.E.2d at 648. 
II Jd. 
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§7A may not be eroded by the denial of a special permit for that use 
when the reason for that denial is the proposed protected use." 21' The 
Court went on to say that the city council could validly impose reasona-
ble conditions on a special permit so long as they did not, either individ-
ually or collectively, practically prohibit the use. 21 
Cape Ann further develops the limitations of municipal action affect-
ing uses protected by section 7 A (now section 6, paragraph 6 of the new 
Zoning Act). The decision makes clear that section 7A may not be 
circumvented by subsequent zoning ordinances even if they do not di-
rectly clash with it. Thus a landowner whose plan has been approved, 
either directly or by operation of section SIP, is insured that section 7 A 
protection will be effective. At the same time, valid community interests 
are protected. This is clear from the Court's allowance of reasonable 
conditions imposed by special permits and its clear statement that sec-
tion 7 A does not insulate a developing landowner from the requirements 
imposed by the state sanitary code or local building codes. 
§15.7. Subdivision Plans: Constructive Approval by Planning 
Board. In Zaltman v. Town Clerk of Stoneham, 1 plaintiff had submit-
ted a subdivision plan to the Stoneham Planning Board for approval. 
After a public hearing, the Board voted to disapprove the plans tenta-
tively until certain changes suggested by the town engineer were made, 
whereupon the Board sent written notice of its action to the town clerk 
and to plaintiff.2 Over the next four months plaintiff negotiated with the 
Board and the town engineer, which culminated in the drafting of a new 
plan acceptable to the Board.3 Plaintiff subsequently determined, how-
ever, that the new plan was unacceptable to him because of its cost. 
Since more than six months had elapsed since the submission of the 
original plan, plaintiff requested the town clerk to certify the plan ap-
proved by operation of G.L. c. 41, § 81U.4 This the clerk refused to do. 
Plaintiff then brought an action to compel the clerk to issue a certificate 
of approval of the plan. 
The Appeals Court considered whether the Board had taken final 
action and, if so, whether such action had occurred within the sixty-day 
limit of section 81 U. The court noted that the Board's action was am big-
20 /d. 
Zl Jd. 
§15.7. 1 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 436, 362 N.E.2d 215. 
z /d. at 437-38, 362 N.E.2d at 216. 
• /d. at 438, 362 N.E.2d at 216-17. 
• Chapter 41, section 81U provides in pertinent part: "Failure of the planning board 
either to take final action or to file with the . . . town clerk a certificate of such action 
regarding a plan submitted by an applicant within sixty days after such submission . . . 
shall be deemed to be an approval thereof." 
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uous, and that the plaintiff, by seeking Board approval of amended 
plan, had conducted himself as if the Board's action was final, thereby 
raising the argument that the plaintiff was estopped from arguing that 
the action was not final. 1 The court did not reach the merits of this issue 
because the town had failed to comply with the requirem~nts of section 
81U.• That section requi'res the planning board to file with the town 
clerk a certificate of definitive action with regard to the approval re-
quest. The court held that the letter the Board sent to the clerk revealing 
its tentative disapproval was too conditional to serve as notice to anyone 
examining the records, which is the purpose of the filing requirement. 7 
Therefore the court held that the planning board had constructively 
approved plaintiff's plan as originally submitted. 8 
The developer's victory may well have been a Phyrric one, in view of 
the court's reference to G.L. c. 41, § 81W. That section permits a plan-
ning board to "modify, amend or rescind" its approval of a plan.v To 
afford the board an opportunity to modify, amend or rescind its con-
structive approval, the court stayed its reversal for a sixty-day period. 
The plaintiff's complaint was to be dismissed if the board took action 
within this period, otherwise judgment would be entered for the plain-
tiff.10 
§ 15.8. Action of Board of Appeals as a Decision: Time for 
Appeal. Massachusetts law requires any party-including municipal 
officers or boards-aggrieved by a decision of a board of appeals to file 
suit "within twenty days after the decision has been filed in the office 
of a city or town clerk."1 Because the pivotal term "decision" has not 
been legislatively defined, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts was 
required during the 1977 Survey year to clarify when a decision is 
deemed made for statute of limitations purposes. 
In Planning Board of Falmouth v. Board of Appeals of Falmouth, 2 the 
Planning Board appealed from a decision of the Board of Appeals which 
had conditionally granted a development permit authorizing the con-
struction of a shopping center within an agricultural district. This ap-
peal was filed twenty-one days after the Appeals Board had filed its 
• 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 439-41, 362 N.E.2d at 217-18. 
• ld. at 441-42, 362 N.E.2d at 218. 
7 Jd., citing Kay-Vee Realty Co., Inc. v. Town Clerk of Ludlow, 355 Mass. 165, 243 
N.E.2d 813 (1969). 
8 Jd. at 443, 362 N.E.2d at 218 . 
• ld. 
II Jd. 
§15.8. I G.L. c. 40A, § 17. 
z 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 559, 362 N.E.2d 1199. 
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opinion.3 Since applicable law required such appeals to be filed within 
twenty days after the decision itself had been filed, 4 the trial court 
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Planning Board chal-
lenged the dismissal with a two-point argument. First, the Board 
claimed that the appeals board had not in fact issued a decision granting 
a variance permit, but had merely issued an advisory opinion suggesting 
that a permit would be granted after particular conditions were met. In 
the plaintiffs view the action taken by the Appeals Board was not a 
decision as such, thereby making inapplicable the statute of limitations 
relating to board decisions.5 
The plaintiff attempted to buttress the first point of his argument by 
referring to Weld v. Board of Appeals of Gloucester. 6 In that case, the 
Supreme Judicial Court held that the decision of a zoning board of 
appeals which had attempted to authorize the operation of a hotel in a 
single residence district subject to certain conditions did not operate as 
a permit since "the board must make a further determination of sub-
stance before the permit can issue."7 As a result, the Weld Court inter-
preted the decision of the board of appeals as a mere advisory opinion, 
and invalidated it for that reason.8 The Planning Board of Falmouth 
argued that since the board of appeals had made its decision condi-
tional, the holding in Weld controlled. The Board thus characterized the 
board's action as an advisory opinion rather than a decision.9 
The Appeals Court refused to be persuaded by this argument. In the 
court's view, Weld did not control because the Falmouth's board's deci-
sion did not "appear to contemplate further discretionary action of the 
board prior to the issuance of the permit."10 Thus, the distinction drawn 
by the Appeals Court was not between conditional and non-conditional 
grants of variances, but "between a condition which contemplates a 
further determination of substance by the board of appeals and a con-
dition which is simply vague." 11 Since no matters of substance were 
left for the Board of Appeals of Falmouth to consider, the decision of 
s Id. at 559, 362 N.E.2d at 1200. 
4 At the time of this decision, appeals from decisions of boards of appeals were governed 
by G.L. c. 40A, § 21. 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 559, 362 N.E.2d at 1200. Acts of 
1975, c. 808, § 3 replaced this provision with G.L. c. 40A, § 17. 
• 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 560, 362 N.E.2d at 1200. 
1 345 Mass. 376, 187 N.E.2d 854 (1963). 
7 Id. at 378, 187 N.E.2d at 856. The board of appeals of Gloucester had approved a 
request to operate the hotel subject to six conditions. One of these conditions was that 
"(t]he water situation must be arranged to the satisfaction of all concerned." ld. at 377, 
187 N.E.2d at 855. 
1 Id. at 379, 187 N.E.2d at 856. 
• 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 560, 362 N.E.2d at 1200. 
11 Id. at 561, 362 N.E.2d at 1201. 
11 Id. at 562, 362 N.E.2d at 1201. 
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the Board amounted to a valid permit appealable at law .12 
The Appeals Court, however, took one further step and held that "a 
decision by a board of appeals purporting to act on an application for a 
variance is presently appealable whether conditioned on further deter-
minations of substance or not."13 While substantive conditions may in-
validate a decision that attempts to authorize a variance as in Weld, 
they do not "vitiate its character as a 'decision.' " 14 A decision is appeal-
able, and subject to the requirements of any applicable statute of limi-
tations, whenever "it purports to be a decision of the board .... " 15 
While an advisory opinion may not, therefore, operate as a valid deci-
sion, it may fulfill the statute of limitations requirement of decision for 
purposes of appeal. 
§15.9. Eminent Domain: Appellate Review and Admissible Val-
uation Evidence. In Haufler v. Commonwealth, 1 the Supreme Judicial 
Court held that appeals from rulings or judgments in a trial without a 
jury conducted under G.L. c. 79, § 222 would not be permitted when 
either party has seasonably claimed his right to a trial de novo before 
another judge sitting without a jury. 
The case arose from the taking of land for the Dorchester campus of 
the University of Massachusetts at Boston in 1969.3 The plaintiff, Hau-
fler, challenged the value paid for his property in a jury waived trial. 
The Commonwealth unsuccessfully sought to introduce evidence con-
cerning the price paid for supposedly similar land at a private sale two 
years before.4 Because the findings of the court concerning valuation 
would be admissible in a subsequent trial de novo, the Commonwealth 
sought to appeal the superior court's ruling which excluded the valua-
tion evidence before a trial de novo was held. 5 
12 ld. at 563, 362 N.E.2d at 1201. 
IS Jd. 
1
' ld. 
II Jd. 
§15.9. 1 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 957, 362 N.E.2d 916. 
1 G.L. c. 79, § 22 provides in relevant part: 
Section 22 . . . The trial shall be by a judge of the superior court sitting without a 
jury .... The judge ... shall file a written decision ... with the clerk who shall 
forthwith notify the parties or counsel. . . . The decision or finding shall include a 
statement of any damages that are awarded and a report of the material facts found 
by him. Any party to the action aggrieved by the decision or finding shall have the 
right to a trial de novo before another judge sitting with a jury. . . . The request 
. . . shall be filed within ten days after the party making the request has received 
notice of such decision or finding. . . . 
1 1977 MaBB. Adv. Sh. at 957-58, 362 N.E.2d at 917. 
• ld. at 958, 362 N.E.2d at 917. 
1 ld. at 959, 362 N.E.2d at 918. G.L. c. 79, § 22 provides in part: 
The decision or finding, including any reward of damages, shall be prima facie 
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The Supreme Judicial Court held that since a trial de novo with a jury 
had been requested under section 22, • the decision of the trial judge 
sitting without a jury was not a final adjudication of the rights of the 
parties; it was thus not a "final judgment" from which an appeal could 
be taken.7 Therefore, the only route for interlocutory appeal in a case 
such as this would be for the trial judge to report the matter to· the 
Appeals Court.8 Because this course was not followed, the Court decided 
that an appeal must await the outcome of the superior court trial.' 
The Court noted that section 22 does not provide for an interlocutory 
challenge to the rulings of the trial judge, and it refused to "engraft such 
a procedure onto the statutory pattem."10 The Court recognized that the 
decision of the first judge was admissible at the jury trial. If the decision 
was based on an error of law (such as the exclusion of admissible valua-
tion evidence), its admission at the jury trial could constitute reversible 
error on appeal from the jury trial judgment. 11 The Court reasoned, 
however, that this risk of additional litigation did not outweigh the 
problems associated with the allowance of an interlocutory appeal. 12 The 
Court noted that the asserted error might not prejudice the seemingly 
aggrieved party during the jury trial and that, in any event, an interlo-
cutory appeal would inject undesirable delay into eminent domain 
cases.13 The Court decided the preferable course to be the presentation 
of all issues in a single appeal. 14 
While one can sympathize with the Commonwealth's desire to have 
an error-free trial de novo, the Supreme Judicial Court's decision was 
clearly correct. The trial without a jury provision is designed to expedite 
eminent domain proceedings since delay can create problems for the 
person whose property is taken. The trial de novo before a jury is still 
evidence upon such matters as are put in issue by the pleadings. 
The Commonwealth argued that the rejection of its proffered evidence concerning the sale 
of the similar parcel had made the award of damages in the first trial improper and 
therefore precluded introduction of the damage award in the second trial. The second 
judge could not exclude the first judge's decision (including the valuation finding) al-
though he might disagree with the first judge's conclusion of law. However, the second 
judge could exercise his discretion to admit or exclude evidence at the second trial regard-
less of what the first judge may have done with such evidence. I d. at 960 n.3, 362 N .E.2d 
at 918 n.3. 
1 Both parties requested trial de novo. 
7 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 959, 362 'N.E.2d at 918. 
1 Id. at 960, 362 N.E.2d at 918. See G.L. c. 231, § 111; Masa. R. Civ. P. 64, 365 Mass. 
831 (1974). 
• 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 960, 362 N.E.2d at 918. 
" Id. at 959, 362 N.E.2d at 918. 
11 ld. at 960, 362 N.E.2d at 918. 
11 Id. at 960-61, 362 N.E.2d at 918. 
IS fd. 
1' Id. at 961, 362 N.E.2d at 918. 
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available to an aggrieved party and any errors in either trial can still be 
resolved by appeal after the trial de novo is held. interlocutory appeals, 
if permitted, would add to the possibilities of delay and seriously impair 
the expeditiousness of proceedings before a judge without a jury. 
Since the Court considered this a case of first impression, it decided 
to exercise its discretion and consider the merits of the Commonwealth's 
appeal rather than merely dismiss the appeal.•• Relying on its prior 
decision in Iris v. Hingham, •• the Court held that the trial judge was 
correct in excluding the evidence concerning the sale of the similar 
property .17 Under Iris, evidence of the price paid for a similar parcel in 
a private sale is not admissible where the private purchaser has also 
provided other non-cash consideration that does not have a readily as-
certainable value.t8 In the instant case, the purchaser of the allegedly 
similar parcel had agreed to construct an access road and railroad siding 
which would benefit seller's adjoining land. The seller had also retained 
an easement in the land sold.•• As in Iris, the cash paid for the parcel 
was not the sole consideration and the other consideration did not have 
a readily ascertainable market value. Therefore, the sale which the 
Commonwealth sought to introduce into evidence was not comparable 
to the taking at issue, where the purchase price was the only considera-
tion. Accordingly, the Court decided that the trial judge was correct in 
applying Iris and excluding the evidence of the amount paid for the 
similar parcel of land. zo 
§15.10. Eminent Domain: Calculation of Interest. In R.H. White 
Realty Co., Inc. v. Boston Redevelopment Authority, 1 the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court confronted two aspects of how interest on damages awarded 
upon a taking of land is to be calculated. The defendant Boston Redev-
elopment Authority (BRA) recorded its order of taking of the plaintiffs 
property on June 1, 1966.2 The landowner, R.H. White, received mail 
notification of an award of $1,171,000 two days later on June 3, 1966.3 
The award was paid on August 31, 1966.4 The BRA awarded an addi-
tional $445,000 to the landowner on March 4, 1969, which was paid on 
March 13, 1969.5 In July 1967, the landowner filed a petition for assess-
11 ld. at 957, 362 N.E.2d at 917. 
11 303 Mass. 401, 22 N.E.2d 13 (1939). 
17 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 964, 362 N.E.2d at 920. 
11 303 Mass. at 407-08, 22 N.E.2d at 17. 
11 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 963-64, 362 N.E.2d at 919-20. 
• ld. at 964-65, 362 N.E.2d at 920. 
115.10. 1 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2740, 358 N.E.2d 440. 
1 Id. at 2740, 358 N.E.2d at 441. 
1 Id. at 2740-41, 358 N.E.2d at 441. 
4Jd. 
• ld. at 2741, 358 N.E.2d at 441. 
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ment of damages, and a verdict of $2,850,000 for the plaintiff was re-
turned on December 19, 1973.8 
The BRA appealed this verdict and the Appeals Court affirmed.7 
Thereupon the Superior court clerk entered judgment for the plaintiff; 
this was nearly two years after the verdict was returned. 8 
The clerk calculated interest on the $2,850,000 award at the statutory 
rate of 6 percent. 9 Interest was allowed on the full amount of the verdict 
from June 1, 1966, the date of taking, to August 31, 1966, the date when 
the first payment was made. Interest was further allowed on the rest of 
the verdict from August 31, 1966 to March 13, 1969, the date of the 
second payment. After subtracting the second payment, the clerk com-
puted interest on the balance until December 19, 1973, the date of the 
verdict, and added the balance, the principal and the interest accrued. 
The clerk then calculated interest for the twenty-three month period 
that the BRA's appeal stayed entry of judgment. The BRA then made 
a partial settlement on November 30, 1975 but withheld nearly $91,000 
in interest that it disputed, representing interest from the date on which 
the landowner was notified of the award until the first two payments 
were made ($17 ,500) and interest on interest during the appeal period 
($73,000).1° The BRA moved in superior court for relief from the judg-
ment, which was denied, and the Supreme Judicial Court granted the 
BRA direct appellate review. 
The first contention of the BRA was that the interest should have 
stopped running on the date the awards became payable, and not on the 
dates that they were actually paid, because R.H. White never demanded 
payment. 11 The Court did not dispute this contention, but it focused on 
the question of when the award was "payable."12 The Court found that 
the language of the 1966 and 1969 award letters did not establish that 
the awards were actually payable, but were "clear assertions that the 
awards were not yet 'payable.' " 13 The court held that interest is tolled 
• ld. 
7 3 Mass. App. 505, 334 N.E.2d 637 (1975). 
• 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2741, 358 N.E.2d at 441. 
' G.L. c. 79, § 37. 
10 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2741-43, 358 N.E.2d at 441-42; Brieffor Appellee, R.H. White 
Co., at 6-7. 
11 /d. at 2741-42, 358 N.E.2d at 441. G.L. c. 79, § 37 provides in part: 
[A]n award shall not bear interest after it is payable unless the body politic or 
corporate liable therefor fails upon demand to pay the same to the person entitled 
thereto. 
12 /d. at 2742, 358 N.E.2d at 441. 
13 /d. In the 1966 letter, the BRA stated: "Payment of damages to parties of interest 
will be made at this office within sixty (60) days. You will be further notified." In like 
tenor, the 1969 letter notifying plaintiff of the second award stated: "Payment of said 
additional damages will be made at this office at your convenience. We will call you when 
payment is ready." ld. 
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only when the landowner is notified of his immediate and unconditional 
entitlement to the award. 14 
The BRA's second contention was that the clerk's allowance of inter-
est on interest was error .15 In dealing with this contention, the Court 
made reference to other statutes providing for addition of interest to jury 
verdicts, 11 but found these statutes, like section 37 of chapter 79, to be 
silent on the exact method of calculation.'7 Since, under G.L. c. 79, 
section 22, judgment is to be entered and execution issued in eminent 
domain cases "as in actions at law," the Court decided that G.L. c. 235, 
section 8 would apply.'8 Under that statute, interest is to "be computed 
upon the amount of the . . . verdict . . . from the time when made to 
the time the judgment is entered."" The Court then observed that in 
1973, when the verdict was returned, judgment did not enter then be-
cause the BRA obtained appellate review by a bill of exceptions. Under 
Mass. R. Civ. P. 1A, par. 7, which became effective July 1, 1974, the 
bill became an appeal. 20 The Court then held: "The judgment thus 
includes interest, and it is common ground that the judgment bears 
interest from the date of its rendition. "21 
The Court then noted that the superior court, in denying the BRA's 
motion for relieffrom judgment, had relied on Nugent v. Boston Consol-
idated Gas Co. 22 In that case the Supreme Judicial Court held that after 
a verdict is returned, interest is calculated from the date of the writ (or 
in the present case, the taking) to the verdict date, and added to the 
verdict. The total then "bears interest to the date of entering the judg-
ment .... " 23 In approving the superior court's application of Nugent 
to eminent domain proceedings, the Court reasoned that a contrary 
" ld., citing Home v. Boston Redevelopment Authority, 358 Mass. 460,465, 266 N.E.2d 
634, 638 (1970). 
11 G.L. c. 79, § 37 states in relevant part: 
A judgment, whether against the commonwealth or any other body politic or corpo-
rate, shall bear interest at the rate of six per cent per annum from the date of the 
entry of such judgment to and including the last day of the month prior to the 
month in which such judgment is satisfied, except that judgment against the com-
monwealth shall not bear interest if it is satisfied within thirty days of such entry. 
In case of trial by jury, the date of entry of judgment refers to judgment in the trial 
de novo. 
For the method of computation utilized by the clerk, see text at note 10. supra. 
11 See G.L. c. 229, § 11 (wrongful death); G.L. c. 231, §§ 6B (damage to property and 
personal injuries) and 6C (contract). 
17 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2743, 358 N.E.2d at 442. 
18 ld. 
II Jd. 
20 ld. at 2743-44, 358 N.E.2d at 442. 
" ld. at 2743, 358 N.E.2d at 442. 
22 238 Mass. 221, 130 N.E. 488 (1921). 
22 ld. at 238, 130 N.E. at 494. 
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result would encourage meritless appeals and deprive plaintiff's of part 
of the benefit of the verdict.24 
The Court's resolution of the issues was proper and soundly reasoned. 
The governmental body that is required to compensate for its taking 
should make prompt recompense for depriving the landowner of his 
property. Something more ought to be required of the government, if it 
wants to toll the accrual of interest from the date of taking, than merely 
to say, in effect, "The award is coming." And when the government 
appeals a jury award, thereby further delaying payment to the land-
owner, it is only fitting that the government be required to pay interest 
on the award so as to compensate the landowner for the lost use of the 
money. 
21 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2344, 358 N.E.2d at 442. The Court took notice of Boston 
Edison Co. v. Tritsch, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1220, 346 N.E.2d 901, wherein the Court 
directed interest on the verdict under G.L. c. ~31, § 6B to be computed as simple interest 
from the date of the writ to the date of judgment. The Court stated that Tritsch should 
not be read as overruling Nugent. 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2743-44, 358 N.E.2d at 442-43. 
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